CSIS has written a thorough review of Israel's options regarding military strike on Iran - I've only read the point form version of it but conclusions were pretty much what you'd expect: possible but fraught with difficulties and dangers; would require about 50 planes, and all of Israel's refueling tankers - would be largest operation ever conducted by Israeli airforce; would almost certainly have to occur before installation of new Russian air defense system; best option coming in through northern Iraq; rules out extensive use of cruise missiles since they lack bunker busting capability - so would seem to rule out any options not requiring US approval re Iraqi airspace or Israeli violation thereof; attack on actual reactor seems unlikely since, according to authors, could result in thousands of civilian deaths from exposure to air dispersed radioactive particles; Israel would have to be willing to accept a partial success since complete success a virtual impossibility given size and complexity of Iranian operations.
So - don't think this changes much concerning my take on subject. Believe Israel has known all along that best they can probably hope for is limited success and they can live with that if they feel they have to, that a partial success is still better than no success at all. CSIS tries to make point that a partial success will result in a mere delay that stokes Iran's ambitions - I'm not sure that makes any sense: if you've decided to risk attack that means you've decided that a nuclear armed Iran is the worst possible outcome and negotiations are a dead end which would mean Iran is committed regardless of international pressure or any other inhibitors thown in its way - so how would an attack that was only partially successful substantially change that dynamic? CSIS also tries to make the point that a nuclear Iran can be contained with missile defense systems and US will try and sway Israel with that argument - but again that argument seems to miss the nuance: Iran wants to use the bomb to leverage its power in the region, a scaled down redux of what USSR did in eastern Europe - only a near foolproof missile defense would counter that. CSIS does not at all seem interested in the rhetorical value of having the bomb, the boom or bust to perceptions of strength that come with it: Iran has already made it a matter of national pride, Israel a matter vital to national security - neither can back away now from the stances they've taken without suffering consequences.
Possibility could still exist that Israel was bluffing all along - but if that were the case the US would have to be in on it and nothing Obama has said or done has been in service of making an attack look viable - Gates came out and essentially ridiculed the idea of an attack just a few weeks ago - guess you could say that's all part of the con, but seems unlikely - guess Gates' statement could mean US knows an attack is not going to happen, but confounds me why you'd wanna make that public - I remain astounded that few seem to recognize that it's in US and Israeli interests to keep attack a viable option, both as concerns negotiations with Iran but also with each other - it'd be foolish to dismiss attack out of hand even if both sides believe it's not a workable option, and yet regularly hear some politician or analyst doing so. Certainly, Israel at least seems serious about keeping the possibility on the table: they just borrowed a few MIG-29s to practice combat tactics against - Iran flies MIG-29s.
