Interesting story in Washington Post today about former key tribal Sunni players in the Anbar awakening, backbone essentially of the successful surge, feeling abandoned by America now, feeling resentful, embittered, at the mercy of Shiites - tribal leaders who have seen the power they acquired while working with the American now gone. In short the story gives the impression that the success of the surge will be short lived if growing Sunni disenchantment of post-surge world coalesces into open opposition.
Also interesting in the story is description of to what lengths American troops on the ground in these restive regions have gone towards indulging and showing respect to the prevailing culture, relating in one instance a CO explaining to new officers the proper way to serve tea when meeting with tribal elders - and yet they're still distrusted, resented, hated.
Again, we're in these countries because of events engendered by the prevailing culture - I have trouble understanding how a military strategy based on preserving those cultures can be successful in the long term - as a short term means to an end? Yes, possibly - but then that necessitates nation building, no? And doesn't that in turn dictate you change the prevailing culture? I assume if we were to attempt a remaking of Afghanistan we're not foolish enough to replicate what was there before.
It perplexes me - I look at COIN and see what they're thinking and understand up to a certain point how they might have faith in it - but after that I come to see the whole idea as resting on a fragile base of vague assumptions and contradictory, or maybe simply disingenuous reasoning. We're an occupying force yet we don't want to be seen as or act like an occupying force - I'm not sure the brutal logic of war can be made to make sense within the confines of those limitations. What's worse, I think the insurgents, the Taliban have figured out how to exploit this self-imposed weakness. We possibly can protect the population and separate it from the 'bad guy' [dubious but possible] but if the Taliban is thinking 'what you're protecting doesn't belong to you, it belongs to us, it will never trust you, but we don't need its trust, we know what they fear and are more than willing to deliver that fear into their huts and places of worship; your soldiers long to go home but this is our home and we are willing to wait forever to return' - if that's how the Taliban see COIN what good is it doing us in the end? Unless of course you're going to engage in nation building which means committing to a culture changing occupation and the idea of total war.
Which brings me back to the above referenced story: if things go south in Iraq how will that impact an American military establishment that has made a commitment to COIN?
