This attempts to make the case for the surge and because it's written by an officer actually on the ground in Iraq and involved in COIN operations you respect the argument - except for three glaring flaws persistently hanging over it: 1] he never addresses how many troops would be required to make the strategy work in a general enough way to make it viable within any meaningful context; 2] he glosses over the fact that even if you can effectively marginalize the 'terrorists' and create secure corridors within the country there is absolutely no reason to believe that good things will then just naturally inhabit those corridors - ie the political motives and intentions of various factions are extremely confused; and 3] he glosses over the key element of security, once achieved, needing to be maintained indefinitely by a highly suspect Iraqi military and constabulary. Without three you just got a big pile of shit and no shovel.
In short, it all sounds nice and neat and professional on paper, but much like Descartes' proof for God, you already need to accept the existence of the thing you're trying to prove exists in order for the proof to be acceptable. Or - it's like buying a used car based on it having a nice paint job and never looking under the hood because, you know, under the hood is where all the bad stuff is and oh my you really need a car and would just rather assume it drives as nice as it looks.
