I don't understand - if the conventional wisdom on North Korea is that they act crazy in order to scare you into giving them something that they need but are not so crazy as to believe they could actually win a war with whomever or avoid total annihilation if they crossed a certain line in provoking the US - if this is the conventional wisdom, ie they won't cross those lines that lead to assured destruction, then where's the rationale in continuing to give them what they want and thereby enabling them to arrive at the brink of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon? If we're saying the crazy boasts are hollow, then where's the logic in conceding to the boast? Likewise, if the proffered rationale of this inaction is that we can't know for sure that they aren't that crazy, then explain to me how it can possibly make sense to allow a country that may indeed be that crazy to develop deliverable nuclear weapons?
Our policy doesn't make any sense as far as I'm concerned, aside from the fact it offers up the comforting illusion that by pursuing it we're avoiding a something worse. But as a practical matter probably the only way to avoid the coming of those worst case scenarios - war or in lieu of war the North becoming a nuclear power [and consequently Iran becoming a nuclear power] - is if China steps in and either convinces the regime to change or forces the regime to change - but they will only do that if they believe we intend to or can be swayed by circumstances into forcing a regime change - yet our policy works entirely against establishing that kind of leverage. And so China sits on its hands, watching and taking notes towards the time when it decides to test America's resolve in the Pacific.
