Two points on Syria that change the math and that I missed entirely in my considerations. One, there's sundry unsavory characters and interests populating the insurgents, the opposition - if the regime falls there's gonna be a lot of high end military hardware, some of it of the mass killing kind, suddenly up for grabs to whomever can get to it - it will be the chaos of Libya times a factor of ten, twenty - leading from behind will not be an option [and it was really only an option in Libya if one was willing to hold breath and look away, which the American media did with great alacrity] - someone, meaning the US military, is gonna have to step in and secure those weapons. This is a nasty problem - which means standing back and letting it all play out does not look like a smart move, no sir. I think Obama may have to choose a side here - accept Assad staying since I really don't think Russia will agree to anything else [although hard to believe opposition will agree to anything less than Assad's removal] and then find a way to negotiate a truce, which may possibly involve a splitting of the country [problem with that is both sides are gonna want Damascus and only one can have it] - or jump into bed with the insurgents to some degree so at least you know who you're dealing with, have a sense of the terrain, so if the worst case scenario comes, ie failed state and anarchy, you've got a leg up on it.
The other problem that I failed to properly heed is the make up of the Syrian military - I was under the impression that Alawites controlled it - and certainly they do control the officer corp, intelligence apparatus, elite troops - but the mass of enlisted are apparently Sunni - I missed that one - dynamic like that definitely does not work in Assad's favor.
