I was happy to see a reputable publication like Foreign Affairs print an essay by a former Pentagon official making case for a military intervention against Iran's nuclear ambitions - happy [probably inappropriate adjective] because author used arguments similar to ones I've made in the past - namely, that people blanch at the thought of an armed intercession because the dire consequences of action are much easier to imagine than the equally dire consequences of inaction - it makes sense for people to fear the thing that seems more real even if an equally disturbing but different reality exists just off to the side - and if after reflection one concludes that the consequences of inaction could prove just as troubling as those following action, then how to decide which option is right - or, possibly more to the point, less wrong? One possible answer: if we are unwilling to stop a universally recognized and feared thing like nuclear proliferation when it comes to so obvious a threat in this regard as Iran, then how do we hope to ever put an end to this growing menace? In short, any notion of stopping proliferation would be reduced to empty theatrics if not farce if Iran is allowed to get the bomb.
Now, I'm not coming out in full support of military intervention - no, my point all along has been that those who have dismissed out of hand any talk of military intervention as preposterous have been engaged in a specious debate with themselves - we all understand the serious consequences of action - it'd be bad - but it would amount to a significant if not tragic dereliction of duty on the part of those responsible if they approach the Iran problem as if inaction is not fraught with very great danger too.
But, of course, I realize that this kind of interventionist reasoning lends itself to a justification of any number of ill-advised and ill-conceived misadventures - Iraq, for instance. Certainly, a simple look to Pakistan quickly starts one down the road of conjuring up doomsday scenarios that seem to veritably plead for intercession - so the trick becomes defining how and why Iran is different, coming to an understanding of how legitimate and viable that difference is, and then figuring out what to do about it - figuring out whether the difference is compelling enough to force upon one the adoption of a daunting imperative.
I've already alluded to one difference that I think addresses the problem - the countries that have gone nuclear have done so essentially for defensive purposes - but Iran's intentions seem decidedly offensive since the only existential threat they face is from internal dissent and upheaval - granted, institutionalized paranoia could cause them to extravagantly inflate threats that are marginal at best - still, it's hard to distinguish Iran's pursuit of the bomb from a regional strategic agenda that could prove quite destabilizing, to say the least. Sure, the US and the USSR eventually came to using their nuclear stockpiles for similar strategic purposes - but how on earth could that fact twist reality so completely as to become justification for us allowing Iran, an irrational, Messianic, Islamist, anti-Western state to replicate that volatile dynamic? In fact, our experiences should vehemently instruct us into doing the exact opposite, and quickly.
And of course it may be somewhat farfetched but it is not at all inconceivable that certain extremist elements resting atop the Iranian regime would see it as the ultimate gift to Allah if one of their nukes found its way into Tel Aviv or New York City.
So, a compelling difference viz Iran - if we allow a regime like that to go nuclear, where does it stop? Who do we say no to? If allowing Iran to go nuclear amounts to an admission of defeat in the battle against proliferation, are we really then saying that we're ok with the devils that will come rushing through the door we've left open? One thing for certain, it can't be that we've come to the point where we are forced to accept our hands being tied since the military option is still there and Israel has demonstrated in Iraq and Syria that it can indeed work - granted, on a much smaller and demonstrably less complex scale.
