horse of george

"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says

To play devil's advocate [really?] couldn't one also say that because Afghanistan is a tribal society that has little use for government this encourages corruption since politicians do not depend on sanction from a motivated electorate?

The general says his command is "not adequately executing the basics" of counterinsurgency by putting the Afghan people first. "ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army," he writes. "Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages."

Again, befriend the Afghan people to what end? To enable a system that encourages defeat? We're in Afghanistan because we're an empire, how does it make sense to fight a war there by pretending we're not? Isn't the real lesson here, fight like an empire or don't fight at all? Again, COIN seems to me based on assumptions made in order to force a strategy on a situation - we don't want to fight like an empire, or possibly we simply can't, so let's do COIN - it seems logical but it isn't since it makes the assumption that Afghanistan is amenable to the strategy.

He also says that coalition forces will change their operational culture, in part by spending "as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases." Strengthening Afghans' sense of security will require troops to take greater risks, but the coalition "cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people."

But isn't this backwards - isn't it rather that the people must be willing to accept the risk of defending their own security? I reread the article Petraeus wrote on the principles of COIN back in 2006 and the first rule he cited was to quote T.E. Lawrence saying in effect let the Arabs do a half assed job themselves rather than we do a much better job for them. We don't have to accept their risks, they have to step up and accept ours.

Overall, McChrystal provides this conclusion about the enemy: "The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much due to a lack of ISAF presence. . . . "

In other words saying 'even if we do what I think we should do I have, in the final analysis, no idea if that will solve the problem of Afghanistan'.

So you support a pull back? No, I support holding Obama responsible for making a campaign pledge of re-committing to the Afghan war, the good war as opposed to the bad one in Iraq as he would have it, when he didn't know what the hell he was talking about and then sending 20,000 more troops over there after taking office which he did as far as I'm concerned for appearances sake and so now if we retreat it's really gonna look like a retreat - which means he's probably going to make the worst decision possible ie, try and fake a commitment. I support holding Obama responsible for that.

So you support a retreat? No, I support a rethink of what I consider to be the fantasy of COIN, a strategy adopted I believe by the generals because they feel they have no other viable options. Afghanistan was a problem to which only two solutions applied: go big, like the empire we are, and conquer it, without pity and without remorse; or go small and keep your objectives limited. We're now stuck in the middle, from which there is no escape without suffering severe consequences, and being led by a president who I'm convinced sincerely believes that forcing a public option on health care on the American people is of much more importance than that dirty little war over there.

So you support a retreat? I dunno. Leave me alone.