Here it seems to me is revealed typical flaw of COIN - an assumption is being made that Afghans want gov't involvement, would welcome it, are desirous enough of the ostensible benefits accruing thereof to fight for such a thing - but a centralizing gov't intervention is in many ways antithetical to tribal needs and desires and Afghanistan remains very much a tribal society, and so potentially assumptions like the one above render COIN from the get go a failure waiting to happen.In a region the Taliban have lorded over for six years, and where they remain a menacing presence, American officers say their troops alone are not enough to reassure Afghans. Something is missing that has left even the recently appointed district governor feeling dismayed. “I don’t get any support from the government,” said the governor, Massoud Ahmad Rassouli Balouch.
Governor Massoud has no body of advisers to help run the area, no doctors to provide health care, no teachers, no professionals to do much of anything. About all he says he does have are police officers who steal and a small group of Afghan soldiers who say they are here for “vacation.” NY Times.
Related: McChrystal has just released new directives concerning troop behaviour, ie respecting Muslim culture etc etc - but to me that reveals a fundamental contradiction - without a change in underlying culture, how can COIN possibly work?