Not since Xerxes have the Persians so confounded the West with their confoundedness - confounded me, anyway - I shall raise my Themistocles against their Zoroaster and salamis them to the salt sea - or reckon alternatively what in the name of the Great Satan is going on here?
Well, first thing I notice is that we still have no idea of how much support A--- has - the only remotely reliable poll done before the election that I know of pegged his support as quite strong, but clearly a large demographic in Tehran feels differently. Although there are indications the election was no doubt tampered with that may have been just to give A--- a clear majority, thus avoiding the dangers of a runoff election - so it would be a mistake to equate vote tampering with him not having a significant base of support. I have read nothing that attempts to answer this fairly important question - still, one thing seems clear: even if we assume a 50/50 break, half the electorate supporting the putative 'reformers', half supporting the status quo, what seems clear to me is that the reformers in such a situation would be the more vulnerable seeing as how their ranks are further split between radicals who seem to want sweeping change and 'conservatives' who merely want A--- and possibly Khomenei as well gone but have no sympathy for undoing the law of the jurists and the idea of Islamic governance.
Khomenei certainly made his allegiance clear in his speech and it seems unlikely he can now back away from those claims without fatally undermining his credibility. The Republican Guard is honour bound to defend him and his cause and may indeed wield even more power than that - ie, Khomenei is so vulnerable here that increasing authority would unavoidably fall to them - still, have read several 'experts' state that it's a mistake to simply assume the Guard's allegiance is monolithic: some seem to think that should a bloody crackdown be required that such a thing might divide the Guard. Still, logic would seem to dictate they remain firm in their 'loyalty' to Khomenei - they have an agenda, Khomenei and A--- are serviceable agents to that agenda and, in reality, siding with the 'reformers' could prove very risky - they could see their influence significantly diminished as anything that served the rise of true democracy would work against their power. On the other hand, that does not necessarily mean that they are loyal to Khomenei - my guess is logic dictates they should be, but who really knows if there aren't maybe competing factions within their rank - and, as I've said, the 'reformers' are not cut from one cloth either and therefore no reason why certain elements of the opposition wouldn't fit quite nicely into the world as the guard sees it. As for their opinion of A--- I'd say they view the role of president as a puppet serving a 'higher' agenda. Also I suppose one cannot rule out that the Guard decides that a violent crackdown is not worth it, meaning A--- is not worth it, and so they may be willing to support a solution proffered by Khomeni because they figure 'no matter who appears to be in charge, we're actually in charge'. I can't see how Khomenei can back down like that and remain inviolable, but if he does I can see how the Guard may view that as doable - it's possible that anything short of the advent of real democracy could get their provisional support, which is why I maintain that change that is anything other than sweeping will prove illusory.
I'd imagine, seeing how crowds have diminished since the show of force, I'd imagine that should that remain the case for another week it would be very hard to bet against the Khomenei faction coming out on top, which in the short term will result in a much more authoritarian and inflexible regime and in the long term who really knows. On the other hand, if we see demonstrations like we saw last week in spite of the militias being out in force then Khomenei's grip on power would look dubious - although you cannot count out that conservatives within the reform movement almost certainly do not want to see the power of the clerics and the supreme Jurist revoked - if they see Khomenei's authority being threatened that is not necessarily something that is going to thrill them - hard to get that genie back in the bottle and ultimately their power depends on that genie being bottled up. So, even should the Khomeni faction fall, it's very hard to say what comes next - my guess is it will not look much different from what it replaces if only because whatever it is will almost certainly be dependent on the Guard for survival - the Guard may ultimately be the only winner once the dust settles, which would probably be a disquieting outcome.
Should Khomenei et al prevail does that make an Israeli strike against nuke facilities more likely? I think so - for the obvious reasons of course - but also because a preserved status quo will need to exert more control, become more oppressive and therefore potentially incite increased anger towards the regime - Israel might conclude that those vulnerable sympathies play to their advantage should they decide to strike.
And what about the Obama? I'm not sure I can fault the American stance at the moment [aside from the fact that I"m not sure I'm seeing a coherent objective operating behind their caution] - rather treacherous waters swirling around this thing as far as the US goes. You have to decide which side, if either, you want coming out on top and then you have to wonder whether American involvement does more harm or good vis a vis that decision, both as concerns the cause at hand and the status of your leader's image: since I never believed negotiations over nukes had any hope of getting anywhere and since I also believe present upheavals will lead to a more not less obdurate regime and consequently must believe confrontation with Iran to be a virtual inevitability I tend to lean towards a carefully calibrated response that has the effect of casting Iran as prime cause of any future complications. My complaint has been media crediting Obama with pragmatic realism regarding his response whereas the reality is complex events have overtaken the simplistic pandering of his rhetoric leaving him with few good options as far as preserving the misguided romance of his vision and his response is merely a reflection of that. Should I care how he got to where he is if where he is is somewhat right? Yes, of course. Without question - it's a long and troubled road ahead and I'd like someone behind the wheel who knows how to drive.
Yet, ya know, I could be making the rather foolish mistake of assuming Obama is responsible for this seeming 'realist' approach to the Iran problem - after all, I have often theorized that Obama would short shrift foreign policy when it failed to yield as willingly to his facile charms as more docile domestic subjects are inclined to do - maybe we're seeing Hillary's hand at work here - always believed she was something of a cold blooded realist at heart [this notion corroborated by article in Politico suggesting her and Gates have very close working relationship?]. Contrary to most it seems I do not believe the course of Obama's foreign policy was realist in nature prior to the crisis - I thought it was marked by a vain sort of optimism and a romance of ideals that left it detached from the realities of the world and America's place in it. But now? Several interpretations possible but not enough evidence to suggest which would be right.
