Lurking behind Obama's approach or non-approach to the Persia problem is the upcoming presidential election in Iran - apparently A--- is opposed by viable contenders, one of whom may actually have a shot in the runoff election most are predicting, with all regardless considered more moderate than A--- and all accordingly espousing a foreign policy that will differ from A---'s - except, from what I read, that's not really the case: a different tone is being promised, but a different policy? Not so much. Less confrontation with the US over nuke policy, sure, but give up the nukes? Not so fast. In other words, what I'm seeing promises a more nuanced, more subtle foreign policy, but no radical divergence from current goals.
Which brings up key point: how much freedom of movement are Iranian politicians allowed by their theocratic overlords? Depends - government is free to pursue initiatives and the Ayatollah is giving the impression of neutrality in the election - but still, the clerics control key offices of government and nothing major gets done unless the Supreme Council oks it. Possibly the clerics object to varying degrees with A---'s style, but much less likely they reject his policies since he wouldn't be there if they did. And lets not forget The Republican Guard - from what I read their role in the government has dramatically increased and not only has A--- solidified his position with them but, even if he were to lose the election, whoever replaces him will not be able to do anything foreign policy wise without their approval.
So, the appearance seems to be that any talk of a possible rise of a moderating influence in Iran this summer which will substantially alter the dynamics at play now is wishful thinking: if A--- is determined to get the bomb it's because The Guard and the clerics are determined to get it, and they're not up for re-election.
