Nineteenth-century Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz argued that “the first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”
Which brings us nicely to Israel invading Gaza: what were they thinking? It's not clear, but with world opinion now squarely against them, the US having merely 'abstained' and not vetoed UN resolution calling for ceasefire, the words of ol' Carl von ring very sharply here: an invasion that does not 'destroy' Hamas will have limited near term benefits for Israel but in the long term will serve Hamas' interests much more than Israel's, regardless of the amount of 'damage' done. When you decided to escalate and invade you better have had a complete understanding of the "kind of war on which you were embarking" otherwise this will eventually amount to wasted effort - worse than wasted because Hamas, which feeds off martyrdom and victimhood, will gain strength from it. Sure, smuggling tunnels will be shut down and then no doubt some kind of ceasefire will be negotiated - but the fundamental logic will remain in place: Israel has no choice now but to destroy Hamas and re-occupy Gaza - well, they have another choice, they can claim to have efficiently degraded Hamas' abilities etc etc - [I say efficiently so I can quote McMaster] who recently wrote re Vietnam/Iraq: "For efficiency in all forms of warfare, including counterinsurgency, means barely winning. And in war, barely winning can be an ugly proposition."
Which is not to say I believe Israel is going to pursue the logic of a war to the finish with Hamas and re-occupy Gaza but rather to suggest that once they decided to escalate and invade an expectation of such should have been understood - which is why I was against it - which is not to say that I don't think they should pursue such but rather to say I doubted that was their intention.
Now, it's possible they gamed the whole thing out and came to the conclusion that 'limited' victories are all they can reasonably hope for at this point - ok, that may be true: but doesn't that support my argument that air strikes were 'enough' to achieve these limited goals, goals that could only be compromised by an invasion that didn't go all the way? You see, the invasion was a counter-intuitive thing, because you would think that it would increase pressure on Hamas but in actuality it increased pressure on Israel to achieve results in keeping with the actions - but if Hamas survives, if its governing philosophy continues undeterred, if its ties to Iran and Hezbollah are strengthened by their suffering at the hands of the reviled Jews, if a world view that tends to see Israeli aggression as unwarranted is lent credence, well then how can the invasion be seen as anything other than a misstep if it does not now pursue results in keeping with its significance?
Update: reasonably reliable source declares Israel's intentions were only ever 'limited': resurrect deterrence legitimacy post Lebanon and work for a truce that will last a couple of years - source seems confident that the invasion's main focus was to lock down Hamas fighters while Israeli engineers laid waste to smuggling tunnels - now that that work is almost done claims Israel will soon either agree to a proposed ceasefire or just withdraw unilaterally [there's disagreement within cabinet on how to proceed here]. If true, I think that means I was right: my plan would have allowed for all that with added advantages of: one, creating the opportunity to degrade Hamas' political credibility; and two, forestalling and then mitigating inevitable international criticism. Plus, my approach would have made a unilateral cessation of hostilities much more palatable - momentum and the upper hand would have stayed with Israel - if they have to sign onto an Egyptian sponsored truce or unilaterally withdraw under the angry glare of world opinion then I'm not sure same will apply, Hamas can turn such to their advantage, regardless of any metric that may call them the 'losers' - can see the spirit of victory kind of slipping to Hamas.
Now, I suppose there could be some military reason that made my plan impractical [in fact there likely are good reasons why my approach was logistically weak] - still, I think for the most part I got this one right... for the most part... possibly...
