Well - seems no one agrees with my belief we we should go to war with Russia over Georgia - didn't actually say go to war with 'em, more just move an aircraft carrier into the Black sea, make some threats, issue ultimatums, sound like you're willing to be fair and accommodating, within the bounds of reason, but do so with a squadron of F18 Super Hornets at your back - that sort of thing. Since it happened, there's been slew of theories and explanations re who's to blame? who was provoked? who was where and did what to whom? did the US drop the ball? is Europe weak and hopelessly compromised? is it legitimate push back by Putin? or Russian nationalism with its delusions of grandeur raising its ugly head? So on, so forth. The beauty of my plan - war - was that it clarified everything in one fell swoop [most fell, I imagine]: Putin was making a statement but at the heart of that statement was a bluff - risk of a wider war - that he knew would deter timorous Europeans and leave the US somewhat isolated and vulnerable and therefore lead to a weak NATO response which would conveniently have the effect of making the message he was sending, to Ukraine et al, that much more daunting. By the US immediately calling the bluff you'd get two things: force the Euros to be proactive, to get in line - you up Putin's ante to them, and since they can't very well side with Putin they're forced into a proper supporting role; secondly, you expose audacity of Putin's bluff, based as it is on a false strength - his forces in Georgia are mere show and would be routed by the States in a matter of days, leaving him humilated and his power gone if he didn't back down.
Of course humiliation, if he didn't back down, can lead to some awful scenarios - but then that's why they call it gambling - and I'm not pretending it wouldn't be risky. But what do you have now having failed to call Putin's bluff? The only alternative for the States to immediate, strong actions was to play the waiting game and hope to undermine Putin's strategy in the long term - the problem with that, which my solution nicely obviated, is that you need the Europeans support to make that work and they are already starting to go soft about making Russia pay for the aggression - my solution essentially agrees with Putin: you can't trust Europe. This was the whole basis to Putin's bluff - and the States got played badly it seems.
My solution risked a military confrontation - but isn't it possible to argue that failure to take that risk has made confrontation a greater likelihood? Certainly Russia is now emboldened and we are left with the weak hand of hoping Putin's intentions are not as treacherous as they appear.
[yes, it's clear now Europe has no stomach for confronting Russia having just released a timid-may-be-too-kind-a-word rebuke. Is this the beginning of the end of NATO? And is maybe that a good thing? It's obviously what Putin wants - although, if one reasons that the States can't be without a strong alliance of some sort, of democracies etc, and therefore in lieu of a NATO would have to forge something new and no doubt more vigorous, then what Putin really wants is an enfeebled NATO - I don't think the States can let him have that]
[is Georgia really worth this? Is this a 'pick your battles wisely' situation? That's the key question. One could draw several feasible and widely divergent scenarios out of what has happened. Hmmn. Thus conscience does make cowards of us all?]
