Can the new or emerging strategy of intimidating or limiting Iran in Iraq - diplomatic, monetary, military proscriptions, prohibitions and proclamations - possibly make any sense without entering into direct negotiations with the Iranians? If the goal is inevitable confrontation, then yes; if the goal is to force compromises, to find a middle ground going forward, then the answer would seem to be no. As said before, the Bush administration's precipitous rejection of the ISG's recommendations, especially those regarding talks with Iran and Syria, tipped their hand concerning how they thought things should play out - once they rejected talks the surge, as it came to be known, was an inevitability.
Four questions then: are Saudis on board [which, if the case, would be cause for worry it seems as regards regional conflict]? Do Bush henchmen really want confrontation with Iran or just the real perception of the possibility of such? If they actually do want confrontation, how far and to what end? Would Iran see actual but limited confrontation as possibly being in their interest and therefore something they might want to encourage?
Possible overriding question: does it not increasingly seem that the US is caught in no win situation? If it confronts Iran it very likely stokes sectarian concerns; if it ignores Iran it very likely leads to a stoking of sectarian concerns. If such is the case what does that say about Bush's decision to apparently confront Iran?
