For being quite well known and respected Ricks seems to write a lot of things that I find off the mark if not entirely wrong and in some cases just flat out dumb - he also tends to be a bit of an Obama apologist, although the post that prompted the response below was ostensibly meant to take Obama to task. I only repeat this 'cause I liked my jab at Obama's books - childish of me I suppose. Indeed.

"On Iran, I think, he has done pretty well-trends are certainly pointing toward a multilateral containment effort."

Where in the hell do you get that from? There's absolutely nothing that has happened to suggest that statement is true in any way. It is not in the interests of the oligarchies governing Iran, China and Russia to comply with what we want - so by containment I guess you mean the de facto condoning of nuclear proliferation amongst 'rogue' nations while hapless Western leaders make various aggrieved gestures and Obama climbs yet another stage to intone 'well, you see, this just isn't right - did these people not read my books?'.

And as far as Obama and Afghanistan are concerned you reporters completely missed the story here: Obama embraced the war as part of a political calculation to get elected and now he wants it to go away and he wants McChrystal to tell him how to make it go away but McChrystal is not telling him what he wants to hear and so he's stuck with a war he needed by didn't want. The 'dithering' you so lightly, almost harmlessly label him with is actually the result of a serious miscalculation that caused him to commit to a war he didn't understand and has now backed him into a corner: retreat and he'll look weak and America's reputation in the region will be further damaged no doubt leading to dire consequences; advance out of fear of losing and there's a good chance Afghanistan becomes his Vietnam.

News that doesn't surprise at all - Russian official closely linked to Putin says world should just relax a little when it comes to Iran etc etc etc. Of course - didn't see that one coming. This thought though: resisting sanctions benefits Russia and China both as regards economics and strategic influence, but one can also see how limited sanctions, sanctions that hurt but not enough to move Iran off its course, can also serve the interests of Russia and China in much the same way by making Iran more dependent on their good graces and bringing it more explicitly into their spheres of influence. It's really hard to see a scenario here that fits Obama's agenda of engagement that doesn't rely on China, Russia and Iran behaving in entirely unexpected ways, ways that seem quite at odds with their evidenced natures and reported histories.

Should we call Obama et al naive then? Blindly idealistic? Or left to the mercy of events by their proclivities and unfounded assumptions?

[you shouldn't just simply ignore that China is playing a tricky game here seeing as how it's still very much dependent on the US economy - trying to undermine the extent of American power without adversely impacting the economic component may prove a strategy with a limited future - and so probably the key question to ask is: does China's desire to maintain the autocratic status quo politically while continuing to exploit a blended, top down, state sponsored genus of capitalism, does that make China less or more likely to take unwise chances or make bad calculations viz its provisionally anti-American strategy? Dunno - but certainly a decision to hedge American power with a nuclear Iran would open itself up to concerns about whether their actions are myopically reactionary or seriously flawed in some other way and lead one to wonder that if China is so concerned about American power that it is willing to condone WMD proliferation amongst dubious nations - let's not forget N Korea - then what does that say about the long term viability of the current relationship between the two behemoths?]

No sooner do I mention how imprudent it is for 'pundits' to dismiss out of hand the logic of a US strike on Iranian nuclear facilities than I read on STRATFOR's site an essay making my very point [well, not my very point but one similar to others I've made] to wit, if Israel concludes sanctions are not viable and that Obama, out of weakness, cannot be trusted to take their concerns seriously, they may very well feel they have no choice but to act themselves - in which case it would be best for the US to do it for them as a means to both improve the chances for success and mitigate the dire fallout. STRATFOR also agrees with me in believing the only way Russia and China support sanctions is if either the sanctions are toothless or they've been promised something significant in return.

Of course, the problem of a military strike on Iran, no matter who does it, is that unless it leads to fundamental political change all you get is a delay to their nuclear program, not an end to it - and unfortunately the most likely scenario is that a strike will enhance the influence of the hardliners, of the Republican Guard, of the religious fanatics, not diminish it - Russia would rush to support them with new arms, new defense systems - America would be forced to commit to more raids to interdict attempts to rebuild capacity otherwise the whole strategy doesn't make much sense - sympathetic Iraqi Shiites would become restive - things would escalate...

On the other hand, you don't stop Iran from getting the bomb you send a pretty clear message to any other troublesome powers who might be thinking about it - not to mention that such a thing would generate a conflicted miasmic wave of Muslim enthusiasm and fear and send it flooding through Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah's Lebannon and Hamas' Gaza Strip, Egypt's embittered jihadists, stirring up demons and setting in motion events that conceivably conjure forth a worse scenario than that imagined for the military strike...

So, what are you saying? That the best option is to allow Iran the bomb and then hope to crush it with economic sanctions that no reasonable person can believe will ever be thoroughly enforced? Ah... well... the best option is to invade the country and destroy it, but assuming that won't be on the table I'm gonna go with, thinking long term, mind you... the least bad option is a military strike... I think. Best guess.

Anonymous WH sources confirm that release of Iran second site intel was not a 'brilliant negotiating ploy' but rather the ad lib I thought it was - but regardless, some are still opining that this plays right into Obama's hands - I don't see that - of course there is a scenario where that could prove true, but much more likely as far as I'm concerned is that this revelation forces Obama into a very tight spot and raises some troubling question viz his 'ingratiating' approach to the Iran problem - I'm not at all convinced that striding to the podium yesterday with France and England to call Iran out was a good idea, not if you're unwilling or unable to back up tough talk with tough actions - but I imagine they felt they had to do it in order preempt Iran's attempts to frame the context of the upcoming negotiations - that troubles me, that indicates to me that they're risking way too much on the negotiations being successful.

Related: every story reports on how getting Russia and China to cooperate is key to getting a deal done but then they don't delve into why Russia and China might be unwilling to play along - the why would tell them that the odds of the outliers cooperating are not good and even if they do cooperate it will undoubtedly be because the sanctions have been watered down to the point of being effectively useless or because they've been promised something that very likely will come back to haunt further on down the road.

Unfortunately, our President shares in Gordon Brown's delusion by wasting time and resources discussing this supposed nuclear free world. I think I may disagree with Gordon Brown regarding what statesmanship and brinkmanship is in this situation though, because negotiations with an end of stopping nuclear weapons development by either North Korea or Iran is neither statesmanship or brinkmanship, because neither country is willing to give up the capability.

North Korea has the bomb, and Iran will have the bomb. If Gordon Brown and Barack Obama want to know what is required to stop Iran from getting the bomb, all they need to do is look at how George Bush dealt with Iraq on WMD. Nothing short of that type of effort stops Iran, so if another Gulf War isn't an appealing option, learn to accept the idea of an Iranian bomb. All this political happy talk of "tough/smart/strong/cunning" negotiations is about as intellectually convincing as the militant threat of air attack by Israel. Neither will be successful, unless Israel nukes the Persians. ID Navy blog.

Well, finally someone who shares my disdain for Obama's 'no nukes' rhetoric. The question I'm interested in here is, since if Iran wants the bomb and has the ability to make the bomb they will have the bomb, what is the point of negotiations aimed at convincing them to do otherwise? If the leadership have decided they want the bomb then nothing short of a compete and unrelenting embargo of the country or, as the above points out, an Iraq-like invasion is gonna stop them - and of those two, probably only the latter [because Russia and China will balk at the former] has much chance of succeeding. So why the charade of negotiations? I have trouble believing anyone actually thinks the negotiations will work [in fact I'd probably be alarmed if they were that naive or bemused by their own cleverness] - can it be so shoddy a business as putting perfunctory act for appearances sake? And to please what audience - the code pinkers and Green Party faithful who actually believe the problem will yield to refined debate?

It's a conundrum because apparently Obama is going to announce today that the US knows and has known for some time that Iran is building/has built a secret enrichment facility - I take it this news is being made public because by means not yet clear Iran now knows that we know. What this means, among other things, is that while Obama was pushing the 'let's talk' approach he knew Iran was proceeding without compromise towards what supposedly we were going to talk them out of.

So, again - why? Is there a cunning strategy here, or just appearances? And if just appearances, why were they so conflicted on how to respond to the Iranian reform protest, a conflict of interests that only made sense if they actually had faith in negotiations?

I suppose this is why Gates was so dismissive of Israeli threats of a military strike - he knew that Israel knew that a strike could never be successful - but, again, if that's so, wouldn't you want to keep the illusion of an attack alive in order to improve you negotiating position if you actually believe in the efficacy of negotiations? I'm not getting this: either the administration is confused about what to do about Iran - or their plan is cunningly obtuse.

update: the Obama apologists are running the story that this is a brilliant negotiating ploy, springing this intel at the last moment to apply ultimate pressure to Iran, Russia and China. Not impossible, but leaves much unexplained. If a strategem, keeping it secret would have been vital so how did Iran find out? Seems more likely this 'brilliant ploy' is just an ad lib made necessary by Iran finding out. Wouldn't it have made more sense to spring this trap during the reform protests, when the regime was at its most vulnerable? If the idea is to shame Russia and China into supporting sanctions, seems to me that would have worked to best effect during the protests when the world's attention was squarely fixed on the questionable practices of the regime. And how bout the fact that calling Iran out like this puts greater pressure on Obama to get a deal done? If Iran, Russia and China still resist, which is likely, certainly for Iran, since their intentions to acquire the bomb are now obvious, won't Obama then be under more pressure to intercede? For this reason you could make the argument that they didn't want this intel to come out at all - you could even argue that this scenario actually improves Iran's position - kind of a "go ahead, make my day" moment, if you will.

One thing is clear: both Bush and now Obama knew about this for awhile - so why didn't they tell IAEA inspectors? The intel was being withheld for a reason - but Bush wasn't into negotiating, so how can a 'negotiating ploy' be the reason? Is it possible that the reason was that, in order to keep the site clandestine, Iran would have to sacrifice security against an Israeli or American attack and now, if his apologists are right, Obama has compromised that military option?

However it came about and why, the more I think on it the more it troubles me that Obama is acting like he now has a winning hand as regards negotiations - because, if he doesn't have a winning hand, and I don't think he does, well... this isn't the kind of game that you can just fold and walk away from - if Iran calls his bluff, if China and Russia see him as vulnerable and choose to exploit that - what happens then? because we know he would not use a military threat, how much would he give away to save face? and if it comes to that would Israel then decide that he can't be trusted and take the dreaded step themselves?

And finally, I'm still struck by how it is just assumed that an American military strike would be worse than Iran getting the bomb - and don't get me wrong, that may very well be true - but you just can't assume it, it's not nearly that clear cut - and yet an American strike is simply passed off as absurd - whereas all we really know for sure is that initially it would seem worse - but five years down the road of a nuked up Iran? I hate the Nazi parallels, but when Germany built up its military against the dictates of the Versailles Treaty, if Britain or America, their concerns rebuked, their calls of alarm ignored, had in response sent a few bombers over Berlin everyone would have been aghast, everyone would have accused them of brinkmanship, warmongering - unless they could have seen into the future and known what Hitler planned to do with that Wehrmacht.

[of course, allowing for your Nazi analogue, the middle east is not Europe - even if Iran succeeds and uses its enhanced powers to further a reckless ambition, what's to be gained by risking a major war to stop them? We save Israel? No offense, but hardly seems worth it - unless of course you see Israel as the linchpin that once pulled sets a whole series of connected events in motion none of which promises goodwill and cheer for the West - and that indeed is the rub]

Quick hit: if US pulls back in Afghanistan what does that say about Gates' Pentagon procurement changes? Much of what the budget changes dictate concerns Gates' admonition 'fund what's suitable for the wars we're fighting now, not may fight in some future' - failure to fund the F-22 for instance is a reflection of that. But if we're not going to fight the war we're fighting now, Afghanistan, then how much sense does the policy defined by Gates' budget make?

Not that Gates' recommendations are all about COIN - but the fact remains that insurgency tactics have been used quite effectively in the wars Gates is referencing and so COIN is implied - therefore, if we're incapable or unwilling to commit to such a conflict now, it certainly seems reasonable to ask what that says about the Gates doctrine.

How much do Russia's shifting opinions on Iranian sanctions have do with them trying to milk more concessions from Obama viz nuclear arms treaties, one of which, START II I believe, needs to be renegotiated by December? I say this because after making it reasonably clear a couple of weeks ago that they probably wouldn't support sanctions on Iran Medvedev, a short week after Obama cancelled European missile defense, has come out and said 'well, maybe we could... I dunno... not impossible I guess...'. I suppose an optimist would say that it's a positive response to a positive gesture and a cynic would say that it's evidence that Putin believes he can play Obama like a fiddle. I of course remain a cynic. What troubles me is that Obama was on again yesterday at the UN with his 'no nukes' agenda and regardless of how wise or delusional one thinks that is by aggressively pushing this agenda and putting the weight of his personality behind it he is in actuality putting himself in a worse negotiating position if Putin has ulterior motives - essentially saying to Putin 'this is very important to me and I'm willing to put my trust in you to make it happen' - as a cynic, that troubles me - just as in his role as cunning Machiavellian oligarch Putin is no doubt cheered by it.

That type of disagreement, otherwise known as "competition," is the beating heart of capitalism. Different enterprises compete with each other by pursuing different strategies. These strategies encompass everything an enterprise does—including how it manages and pays its employees.

At bottom, all the practices of an enterprise are tacit predictions about which procedures will bring the most reward and which ones will avoid excessive risk. Accurate predictions bring profits and survival; mistaken predictions bring losses and bankruptcy. But nobody can know in advance which predictions are right. By allowing different capitalists' fallible predictions to compete, capitalism spreads a society's bets among a variety of different ideas. That, not the pursuit of self-interest, is the secret of capitalism's achievements.

To be sure, capitalists' different ideas are all, in the end, about how to gain profit. That's why incentives matter. But what matters even more are diverse predictions about where profits—and losses—are likely to be found. For this reason, herd behavior is a danger to capitalism, if the herd bets wrong. But herd behavior is imposed on capitalists every time a regulation is enacted—and regulators, being as human as bankers, can be wrong.

Regulations homogenize. The Basel rules imposed on the whole banking system a single idea about what makes for prudent banking. Even when regulations take the form of inducements rather than prohibitions, they skew the risk/reward calculations of all capitalists subject to them. The whole point of regulation is to make those being regulated do what the regulators predict will be beneficial. If the regulators are mistaken, the whole system is at risk.

That was what happened with the G-20's own Basel rules. Now the G-20 has decided to blame the crisis on bank compensation systems, which it proposes to homogenize just as it had previously homogenized bank capital allocation. What has not been explained is why we should trust that the G-20's regulations won't be mistaken once again. Jeffery Friedman, Wall Street Journal.

I don't have much to add to that - gov't is just as culpable for this crisis as business, more so probably - banks took on too much risk based on dubious calculations and questionable motives, but much of this behaviour was incentivized by gov't policy and regulation - but the storyline that has been allowed to emerge, encouraged to emerge is that capitalism is in essence bad and consequently the crisis is all the fault of Wall Street greed which now only gov't - and Michael Moore, apparently - can save us from. It's a case I think where the response to the crisis may prove more baleful than the crisis itself.

"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says

To play devil's advocate [really?] couldn't one also say that because Afghanistan is a tribal society that has little use for government this encourages corruption since politicians do not depend on sanction from a motivated electorate?

The general says his command is "not adequately executing the basics" of counterinsurgency by putting the Afghan people first. "ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army," he writes. "Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages."

Again, befriend the Afghan people to what end? To enable a system that encourages defeat? We're in Afghanistan because we're an empire, how does it make sense to fight a war there by pretending we're not? Isn't the real lesson here, fight like an empire or don't fight at all? Again, COIN seems to me based on assumptions made in order to force a strategy on a situation - we don't want to fight like an empire, or possibly we simply can't, so let's do COIN - it seems logical but it isn't since it makes the assumption that Afghanistan is amenable to the strategy.

He also says that coalition forces will change their operational culture, in part by spending "as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases." Strengthening Afghans' sense of security will require troops to take greater risks, but the coalition "cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people."

But isn't this backwards - isn't it rather that the people must be willing to accept the risk of defending their own security? I reread the article Petraeus wrote on the principles of COIN back in 2006 and the first rule he cited was to quote T.E. Lawrence saying in effect let the Arabs do a half assed job themselves rather than we do a much better job for them. We don't have to accept their risks, they have to step up and accept ours.

Overall, McChrystal provides this conclusion about the enemy: "The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much due to a lack of ISAF presence. . . . "

In other words saying 'even if we do what I think we should do I have, in the final analysis, no idea if that will solve the problem of Afghanistan'.

So you support a pull back? No, I support holding Obama responsible for making a campaign pledge of re-committing to the Afghan war, the good war as opposed to the bad one in Iraq as he would have it, when he didn't know what the hell he was talking about and then sending 20,000 more troops over there after taking office which he did as far as I'm concerned for appearances sake and so now if we retreat it's really gonna look like a retreat - which means he's probably going to make the worst decision possible ie, try and fake a commitment. I support holding Obama responsible for that.

So you support a retreat? No, I support a rethink of what I consider to be the fantasy of COIN, a strategy adopted I believe by the generals because they feel they have no other viable options. Afghanistan was a problem to which only two solutions applied: go big, like the empire we are, and conquer it, without pity and without remorse; or go small and keep your objectives limited. We're now stuck in the middle, from which there is no escape without suffering severe consequences, and being led by a president who I'm convinced sincerely believes that forcing a public option on health care on the American people is of much more importance than that dirty little war over there.

So you support a retreat? I dunno. Leave me alone.

In the category of 'all the bloody things I don't have a clue about', while doing some reading on the history of nuclear arms policy, given Obama's recent decision to cancel European missile shield and my skepticism re his overtures in general thereof, I find that Paul Nitze, father of the American nuclear deterrence posture, near the end of his life called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I only mark this since I've ridiculed Obama in the past for calling for the same. I understand an old man warming to death and making an appeal to fantasy - but that only entrenches my opinion - to wit, that such calls place emotion over facts; that abolition would require an infallible method of verification, of which no technology exists that can promise such a thing; the law of unintended consequences - ie, just as we really couldn't predict the dynamics of a world with nuclear weapons, how can we pretend to understand what a world suddenly without them would be like? In other words, would such a world prove more dangerous or less? I mean, any sane person understands the emotion of 'O god, please rid us of this plague' - but in reality? Not so clear.

I continue to maintain that it is not in the nature of humans to give up or abrogate successful weapons technologies, both offensive and defensive - instead they develop new ones that render old ones either irrelevant or less threatening. Ergo, missile defense - I would consider any focus placed on abolition that drew impetus and resources away from missile defense to be an extremely unwise move.