With Press Secretary Gibbs attacking Cheney re Bush administration's supposed dropping of ball in Afghanistan does that then indicate that Obama will be taking McChrystal's advice and commit to undropping the ball? Or does it mean they will be forging an opposing or alternative strategy which they will defend by saying Bush mismanagement left them with few options? Given the continuing delay in rolling out a decision hard to believe it's anything but the latter - though possibly Gibbs, in effort to fill dithering void, simply said too much.

I continue to believe Obama's sole purpose here is to look like his campaign rhetoric wasn't simply campaign rhetoric and that he's not the one who lost Afghanistan if indeed he ends up losing Afghanistan, both of which could conceivably doom his chances in 2012. In other words, everything Obama has said and done or will say and do regarding Afghanistan, and Iraq for that matter, has and will continue to be all about serving limited domestic political ends.

What will be curious to see, among other things, is if the military leadership see Obama and his actions or lack thereof in the same light I do, how will they respond? In this regard, I wonder if Gates, a conservative, was acting as a true public servant when he chose to stay on and serve a very liberal president? Maybe he saw what was coming and realized that without a reasonable counterweight operating in the oval office bad things could happen.

I don't have any overwhelming desire to hammer on the 'Obama is a communist/socialist' meme [even though I do invoke the charge often - out of a sense of fun of course] but this note from Fund in the WSJ does jar the sensibilities a wee bit:

Anita Dunn, the White House's communications director who has declared war on Fox News, came under scrutiny herself last week when it was discovered she had told an audience that Mao Tse Tung was one of her favorite political philosophers and quoted Mao on how to "fight your war." In her speech last June, after she joined the Obama White House, Ms. Dunn said the "two people I turn to most" were Mother Teresa and Mao Tse-Tung. She barely discussed the late nun, but waxed at length about the lessons Mao had taught her. To call Mao a "political philosopher" is a stretch. As Roger Kimball of the New Criterion reminds us, the great Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski properly labeled the Chinese revolutionary "one of the greatest, if not the very greatest, manipulator of large masses of human beings in the twentieth century." Indeed, the Mao revelation prompted William Ratliff, an expert on China with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, to call her statement "outrageous and pathetic" given that Mao's role in the deaths of some 50 million people "makes it impossible for any serious person" to view him as a great philosopher.

Certainly any administration has its share of wackos and deviants and enthusiasts with inappropriate affiliations - but there does seem to be too many roads leading from the ultra left into Obamaland - enough to accommodate the long march home of a lost generation of uber liberals? So far he's done little to dispel the notion - the press seems to want to continue to prop up the idea or mere perception or outright lie that he's tracking a moderate course but I don't see it at all.

Report circulating that Iran has agreed to send LEU [lightly enriched uranium] to Russia for processing, with indications that this retards their progress towards developing the bomb by about a year and this all hailed as possible 'diplomatic' success in attempt to thwart Iran's nuclear aspirations - to which I say 'are you people fucking crazy?'.

One, there's probably, in fact there's almost definitely no way to tell that if Iran actually follows through on this [huge if as far as I'm concerned] that the amount of enriched uranium they end up sending off to Russia represents a significant dent in their stockpile, enough to impede development of the bomb - and there's a good reason for this ie we have no idea how much EU they have! Whatever they end up shipping to Russia could just be a token amount - in fact, if they're really clever they could have been planning for this deception all along, carefully making it seem like they had a certain amount of EU when it fact they have more. And let's not forget that there are rumours that problems exist with some of Iran's LEU, problems that make it unsuitable for bomb making - I read this in technical journal and the details of it were beyond my understanding - but if true, if that compromised LEU is what they end up sending to Russia, then such an act would be pretty useless, no?

Two, the current regime in Iran is under siege, vulnerable, supposed progressive forces want to see it unseated and brought to shame - what on earth would be the advantage to them of looking weak on an issue they have staked a great amount of their credibility and prestige on? The whole focus of their anti-Western, anti-Israel international position has been buttressed up by the threat of a nuclear inevitability - how the fuck would it serve their purposes to now cave in on that? One would have to indulge the belief that they are at peace with accepting their demise as a political power and willing to admit to being ideologically flawed - pretty selfless acts for revolutionary autocrats. What next, the leader of Hamas is going to proffer a hand of friendship across the bomb scarred border of Gaza and say to Israel: 'enough is enough - let's embrace a better future together'. I mean, c'mon people.

Fact is, the Persian sense of superiority over Arabs and how that impacts their regional strategy combined with the political utility the bomb represents to the current regime combined with the anti-Western logic of the '79 revolution and the ties of all the big players in Iran to that logic - Khamenei, A--- and the Republican Guard - these things all point to Iran wanting the bomb, needing the bomb and probably being willing to do just about anything to get it. Furthermore, it is also a fact that the current regime knows China and Russia will back them because all their respective interests dovetail on this issue - and without China and Russia you've got nothing - so you're telling me you think Russia and China are going to act against their perceived interests and by doing so substantially empower Obama, a leader they no doubt read as enticingly weak? Again, are you people outta your fucking minds?

World, here's a hand-basket and if you look just over there you'll see the road to hell - have a nice trip.

China apparently tells Israel it will not support sending the Goldstone report to the UN Security Council - proof positive that China will not be backing sanctions against Iran? Make the shallow pro-Israeli gesture now to provide cover for the deeper anti-Israeli move to come? Personally, I don't need further demonstration of what the logic of China's actions so far lead one to believe concerning their intentions - but since China has already in another forum supported the Goldstone report I'd say the game they're playing here is pretty obvious.

Mr Coll, author of Ghost Wars and therefore a point of view that should be respected, weighs in on the situation in Afghanistan. His two main points, if I remember correctly, seem to be that those calling for taking the Afghan war offshore or of just focusing on Al queda do not understand the synergistic relationship that holds between the Taliban and AQ and, closely related to that, do not understand how difficult it will be to get actionable intelligence without a significant presence on the ground. His second point was that Afghanistan will remain hostile to our interests until some semblance of a somewhat unifying and relatively competent government emerges - his point being that, contrary to what many are suggesting, this is only difficult, not impossible, that Afghanistan has had a functioning government, army and constabulary before and can again - it may not prove to be law and order according to Western standards but it will be good enough for Afghanistan.

He doesn't talk military details, force size and disposition etc, I suppose he feels, and no doubt rightly so, that the expertise of military professionals has to be trusted here - but he does seem to endorse the idea of COIN and the potential of nation building but states clearly that a commitment must be long term - and he states that forming a national army is only possible if there's a sense of a national government. My impression is he believes there's no workable option that includes accommodating the Taliban and trying to 'limit' it - my sense he feels it needs to be destroyed and that Pakistan will help once they see it on the run in Afghanistan - although he suggests Pakistan can be a productive partner he also clearly states that it hasn't been in the past and there are no guarantees of how it will behave in the future - he seems to say that there is a significant divide within the Pakistani military about what end state viz Afghanistan and the Taliban will best suit Pakistan's interests - he would say that India continues to loom large in a not particularly logical way for many in the Pakistani military - that is certainly a view point I've read elsewhere.

To wrap it in as discrete a package as possible I'd say this: if one applies an extremely loose conception of what a government is or need be then no doubt you can wrest such a thing out of the inchoate mess that is Afghanistan - but because of the lack of money or any monied future and how that restricts potential I think you're never going to be able to get too far away from a warlord driven, clan driven, tribal/theological diffused dispensation that coheres tenuously but neither significantly prospers nor declines - and therefore you're never going to get too far away from corruption - like Mexico, but much worse and without the nice beaches. Coll suggests Afghanistan was a problematic but manageable country before the Russians invaded - possibly - but I might say the Russians invaded because the defining premise is not quite accurate.

To get conciser and more narrow still and thereby broader and more general [art thou there, Truepenny?] I say this: there are wars with short term objectives and ones with long term objectives; long term wars need to be big, you cannot compromise on that; the problem with both Afghanistan and Iraq is that they were long term wars fought as is they were short term ones; it's hard now to go back and correct those mistakes - but you may not have a choice and Afghanistan will prove harder than Iraq; a military mistake left uncorrected or unaddressed will come back to haunt you.

Waiting for the 12th Imam - if the real point of contention between the looming military dictatorship and the putative reformers in Iran is the true role of the clergy in governance while they wait for the 12th Imam - the reformers believing it should be muted, Khamanei and A--- not so much - and not at all about liberalizing the theocracy, then what would that say about what reform would look like should the 'radicals' succeed in unseating the status quo? One's tempted to say any change enacted would be superficial, cosmetic - but the Republican Guard is a wild card - you could see a 'reform' chain reaction that leads then to social upheaval that leads to martial law - I could also see a scenario where the reformers gain control but out of fear of what demons they've unleashed become just as reactionary and repressive as current regime and in likewise fashion crawl into bed with the Guard - but regardless my point is if all that separates the reform from the status quo are protocol questions having to do with the 12th Imam, well then what does that say about the prospects for and nature of some hoped for reform?

Related, I also wonder: if present regime manages to make Iran a nuclear power I imagine that will leave its authority unassailable - does it then follow that the reformers have a deadline if they want to get something done? And if so should we then be more interested in giving them a helping hand?  Of course, since Obama was given the Nobel for being willing to engage with bad people, for apparently being able to engender a brave new world simply by talking about it, I suppose he won't be doing that - besides, as I said, the dynamics involved here are hard to predict - I'm just saying there appears to be an opening there that probably should be examined.

A report in a French newspaper says Israel will soon be deploying covert strike teams into Iran to blow stuff up and assassinate key people in the nuclear program - who knows if this is true but I realized I should have thought of this before - all the talk and gestures aimed at keeping the threat of an air strike alive could really have been about hiding the true tactic of using special forces on the ground. Air strikes were an iffy proposition no matter how you looked at it and best case scenarios guessed at most Israel delays Iran's plans by a few years - it could be Israel has decided that covert operations can do just as well as that but with the added advantage of limiting the ways Iran can retaliate - they obviously could still launch missiles in response but such an indiscriminate act would be more difficult to justify given the discrete nature of Israel's aggression thus possibly limiting Iran to employing its terrorist proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, to exact revenge - which would be bad, sure, but still, a threat Israel understands and has acquired significant expertise in defending against.

On the surface, this kind of makes sense - allowing for the fact that I have no realistic idea of just how much havoc Israeli special forces can unleash. I would imagine that to be successful some, possibly many operatives would already have to have infiltrated Iran.

China reaffirms its 'close' ties with Iran and the mutual benefits thereby derived - which is China's way of saying 'we value this strategic relationship and everything we do or say will be a reflection of that' - which is China's way of saying 'fuck you, America, this is our century: if your own president doesn't believe in American exceptionalism we sure as hell aren't gonna act as if it matters'.

And on cue Putin chimes in with a 'there's no need to rush Iran or get all up in their face with sanctions - everything is cool, man - just chill people' and then throws out tasty bit of info detailing how Russia has changed its rules of engagement concerning defense of the nation to allow for the use of nuclear weapons against threats even if the threat is conventional in nature. Nice.

As absurd as it was giving Obama the Nobel Peace Prize, what was more disturbing, once one stopped guffawing or laughing outright, was realizing that a great many people actually believed it was deserved, actually believe that the world is fundamentally changed for the better simply because Obama is president, regardless of any manifest accomplishments - that the world is better simply because Obama says it can be. It's shocking, dumbfounding - I'm found dumb by it.

And so it is 'drinking the cool-aid' no longer captures the degree of delusion that follows this man. He's tapped into a willful ignorance that surpasses mere stupidity, surpasses even the abject cretinism of the fatuously naive - it's as if he's accessed some pathological dementia, a vestigial obtuseness, that lurks in the shadows of the species' collective psychology waiting for a perfectly insipid incantation to call it stumbling into the pallid light - yes we can.

Or is it - apropos previous post - is it that the generals are thinking about Vietnam? In the sense, after Abrams took over and COIN employed by '72 you had something that looked like victory in Vietnam - and then, if you believe the history of some, the US congress withdrew support for a functioning and largely pacified south and the north, with the support of China, broke the peace accords and invaded thus leading to the 'defeat' we now associate with Vietnam.

If they do have that in mind, and it's hard to imagine they don't, then I guess my speculation about them angling for a 'token' victory is misguided - they would realize that a loss is a loss no matter how clever you are in trying to reframe it.

I was reading a review of Galula's renowned counterinsurgency tome and one thing Galula stipulates, that seems revealing viz Obama's dithering over what to do in Afghanistan, is that the country sponsoring the COIN action cannot look weak - if the victimized population sees weakness in their ostensible saviours or perceives a reason not to trust their commitment, the cause will be lost. You can see how the military leadership right now is probably none to happy with Obama - they thought they already had a commitment [with good reason] and now are to say the least no doubt discomfited by the knowledge that anything that makes that commitment look tentative could prove fatal, could undermine the whole strategy. They must feel they've been played and betrayed - nothing Obama has said indicates that he is going to give McChrystal what he's requested even though everything he did and said during the campaign and when he first took office suggested he was on board with the strategy - but even if he does sign on the strategy is weakened, possibly beyond salvaging, by the delay in making a decision - at the very least, if one follows the dictates of Galula, a difficult mission has been made much more difficult - it's hard to see a scenario here that doesn't end with the military feeling disappointed - yeah, I'd say Petraeus and the boys are not big fans of the Obama right now.

The other thing that struck me was a flaw in Galula's argument that the reviewer pointed out and is in line with my thinking, namely, just as with the insurgency, the counterinsurgency must be motivated by a cause - but what if the the population the COIN seeks to protect does not share the cause? If our cause is to bring to Afghanistan good governance and other advantages of a modern civil society - and as I've said many times before getting involved in a war like this only makes sense if that indeed is your cause, by definition there has to be a culture changing imperative otherwise what is the point? - but what happens if the target population prefers, as the writer of the review states it, the 7th century? Galula writes about the role fear plays in an insurgency - what if to Afghans the best way to avoid fear is to cling to their medieval tribalism and tolerate their Taliban masters - what if to them that represents the lesser of two evils?

This seems to be the weak link in COIN thinking - at the very least it suggests the need for a long involvement in the victimized society and I just don't see how America can make a commitment like that. I know that McChrystal's plan is to hand things off to a revitalised Afghan military a couple years from now - but that idea sounds pretty shaky to me - Afghanistan doesn't really inspire confidence in that regard. [is it possible Petraeus et al also see that and their whole objective here is to merely create a scenario that looks less like an American loss and more like a failure by Afghanistan to preserve the win? Seems possible to me]