China and North Korea

Let’s think about China and North Korea, because that is the dynamic that matters here when thinking about the NK threat/crisis. Put simply, China has clearly made the decision that the possibility of a unified Korea is a much bigger problem for them than the thought of North Korea as a nuclear power. Possibly they justify this irresponsible behavior by thinking a nuked up North Korea can be ‘contained’ and therefore the threat is overstated, possibly they justify it by claiming all great powers act in their own interests and view any change to the despotic NK regime would amount to a threat to their own despotic regime - North Koreans being freed from tyranny no matter how chaotic that process might be would eventually for China prove a bad example for its own people to contemplate and maybe envy. For China, protecting the status quo in North Korea is all about protecting the status quo of one party rule in China and keeping a unified Korea and the American military presence that would come with it from its border.

Here’s the problem about that for China - believing you can put off in perpetuity NK morphing into a serious problem re China’s national interests is based on notion that eventually America will simply learn to live with the threat - but what if the US decides that they simply cannot accept the threat, which is certainly what I believe to be the case? Then China refusing to take significant actions to shutter the NK nuclear program would necessarily lead to significant US actions - of which I think there are only two types, both of which eventually lead to the use of force. One, robust increases in both American ABM assets in the area and an American military presence overall ending in the US ultimately having to commit to intercepting NK missile tests; or two, a larger use of force - beginning first with sanctions and some sort of blockade of NK, putting China in a very difficult position - graduating then to targeted strikes on NK missile tests - and finally to a massive strike or at least the very credible threat of a strike on the NK military - and absolutely no one, especially the Chinese, wanna see that.

Logically, it seems to me, when it comes to how China currently sees its national interests, which is all about preserving the status quo of one party rule and preventing a unified Korea, then no matter what happens in North Korea is bad for them if you believe the US simply cannot allow NK to become a nuclear power. Given that’s the case here the questions become - can you convince China of this reality and what’s the next step if you can - in other words, what’s the next step if China becomes an active partner with America and its allies in closing down the North Korean nuke program? I’m guessing that would depend on whether or not China has a plan to stage a coup in NK and just as importantly contacts with elements within the regime to bring such a thing about. Now, clearly given how China currently views its national interests it really doesn't wanna be doing something like that - but we’re working with the assumption that you’ve managed to convince China that its national interests are going to take a hit no matter what - and if so a coup becomes the best option, even better than Kim simply backing down since he could never be trusted to abide by any agreement - although China would obviously prefer Kim simply backing down. If China hasn’t nurtured the wherewithal to stage a coup, then I think the only option becomes bringing one about by completely shutting down the NK economy - a much more dangerous scenario since, if a coup fails to materialise, war becomes probably inevitable - and then it will all be about how successful the US and its allies are at making it a short one.

Again, how one views this problem is entirely dependent on whether you believe America can or cannot live with a nuked up North Korea. Clearly, with Obama, China could safely believe in America doing nothing serious about the threat - but I think that calculation no longer applies with the national security team Trump has put together - I think moves made by Mattis et al point to a much more reliably hardline foreign policy. Yes, if that’s true, weakness or general mismanagement and irresolution from Trump can completely erase those hardlines and no doubt China will try and drag its feet as much as possible while it figures this potentiality out - but right now my guess is that as long as Mattis et al seem to be handing him ‘successes’ Trump will give them a lot of leeway re standing up a strategy going forward.

[the recent failed launch of a test missile along with another failure not long ago raises another angle to the debate over North Korea - namely, what if the US has developed the ability to use cyber weapons against NK’s nuclear infrastructure? Certainly, this is entirely possible - it’s just that I’ve not yet read from a source I trust a credible case for it. But if we assume it’s true, the problem I have with it is that I wouldn't see it as a long term solution - great short term payoff - but long term no - although I might change my mind about that once I read something that credibly lays out how that approach would work. I mean, even if it is true I assume there are countermeasures and probably pretty effective ones that NK can roll out - hell, Stuxnet was a pretty sophisticated cyber weapon and it fell short of its hoped for potential - so count me at the moment dubious about the merits of this]

Is Tillerson talking too much?

Is Tillerson talking too much? He does seem to be using more ‘humanitarian imperative’ kind of language re Syria than I’m comfortable with - once you start adding to WMD use things that might bring a military response to me you’re opening the door for Putin and Iran to box you into a corner with some non-WMD barbarity - which means if you haven’t mapped out your moves should that happen you’re opening yourself up to either looking weak and confused if you don't respond or dangerously escalating things if you do. Now, I have a lot of faith in Mattis and McMaster and it looks like Trump does too, so I’m giving them the benefit of the doubt that the moves being made and the language being used are all part of a considered plan - still, feeling a little on edge here.

I mean, let’s look at the carrier group diverted from a trip to Australia now headed to Korea - what that tells me is that along with the speed with which the strike in Syria was carried out and the fact that they were tracking the Syrian plane that dropped the bomb that it sure looks to me like Mattis et al had already put a plan in place before Assad acted - in other words, everything currently in motion was seen as being inevitable given Assad’s previous behavior and the broad outlines of a response had already been developed - which means, I hope, that Mattis et al know exactly what the purpose of the Carl Vinson strike group heading to Korea is - but what if that’s not true? What if this has all been assembled during the very short window between Assad’s action and Trump’s response? And what if diverting the Vinson was sort of an ad hoc move designed to take advantage of an opportunity to exert pressure on China to do something about the growing nuclear menace of North Korea? I have a very hard time believing that's the case - but if it is and China won’t or simply cannot do anything about the insanity coming to a head in North Korea, well, what the fuck then? Just turning the Vinson around and going back home would decidedly not be a good outcome.

China really has created significant problems for itself by allowing the North Korean nuke program to get so far along - assuming of course they’ve always had the ability to stop it but didn’t for whatever reasons. All their choices now are bad - America takes military action to topple or destabilize the Kim regime - America doesn’t take military action which necessitates an extreme enhancing of ABM assets in South Korea and Japan and possibly one of those countries deciding to go nuclear - China itself must take military action to topple the Kim regime. Given those bad choices, I would assume if China indeed does have the ability to stop North Korea’s nuke program, now would be the time to get off your ass and do it. And maybe that is the precise point of sending the Carl Vinson to Korea - a calculation that given its options China really has no choice but to do something about Lil’ Kim.

[there could be another reason for the Vinson heading to Korea as has been pointed out to me - it would involve what I’ve considered for a long time to be something the US should seriously think about doing - either shooting down North Korea’s test missiles in the boost stage or possibly even destroying the missiles as they sit on launch pads fueling up. As said before, if they can’t test the missiles they can’t perfect the technology, which wouldn’t necessarily end their nuke program but would put significant hurdles in the way of it. Now of course even this limited military action could escalate in a very worrisome way - but if the point is to force China into coming up with a solution of its own, this may be the kind of risk you have to take. Afterall, North Korea is a problem China created and maintained - the deranged regime is their rabid cur which they’ve kept around to keep intruders out of a junkyard - and now that sick animal is about to mutate into a monstrosity that the junkyard fence cannot contain - it’s wholly China’s responsibility to put the creature down and if they’re not going to do it they completely lose the right to complain about the consequences of that]

more on the Syria business

Further on the Syria strike - some are complaining the attack wasn’t violent enough - that was my first thought too, should have seen more damage to Assad’s military assets - then I thought the scale of the attack could have been limited by one, the presence of Russian troops complicating things, and two, a calculation that more attacks will probably be necessary so give yourself room to move. Why will more action be necessary? Because of likelihood that Putin and Iran will feel the need to look resolute. Indeed, military leaders from Russia and Iran declared their own red line, promising a response should the US strike Syria again. A pretty bellicose statement seeing as how the US appears to have solid proof that the Assad regime dropped a chemical weapon on civilians with possible Russian collusion since the weapon was dispatched from an airbase where Russian troops are stationed - seems hard to believe they wouldn’t be aware of chemical weapons being stored at the base and of one being loaded on a plane - I’m guessing it’s a fairly elaborate procedure fixing WMDs to a plane. Given that, I’d interpret this bellicose language as bluster Russia and Iran feel they have no choice but engage in - or the preamble to more provocative actions, possibly even another chemical attack. Both Putin and the Iranian theocracy have clearly demonstrated a willingness to engage in ruthless acts - and both regimes trade in the perception of being strong in the face of American aggression - so certainly possible they will choose to raise the ante and dare Trump to draw down again.

If that happens question then becomes how many moves ahead has Trump’s NATSEC staff mapped out? These guys have too much strategic knowhow and experience not to have a game plan ready should Putin and Iran choose to go down the dark road of escalation - and that experience will tell them that when it comes to these things nothing is guaranteed. The question then becomes - what will Trump do with that advice? As it stands now, Putin has saved Assad’s ass - Syria is very likely to be broken up, but Assad should manage to keep control of the most important bits - but America can take that all away should Putin and Iran goad it into rethinking regime change. That’s a lot to lose betting on Trump backing down.

Of course we can have no idea about the kind of intel the US has on Syria -  I mean, they knew to track that plane carrying the chemical weapon, something that even might have taken the Russians by surprise - so this situation may look a whole lot clearer or more predictable from the inside then it does from the outside. And there’s another angle to consider - Putin has a couple of goals in Syria, but the biggest one may be establishing a naval base in the Mediterranean - but I read a story a few days ago in the Jerusalem Post that claimed Israel had given Russia intel about how Iran has the exact same aspiration and that this news may complicate just how committed Putin wants to be about Syria. Who knows - but historically, Russia and Iran are enemies not allies, so maybe this alliance they’ve formed is not particularly stable. I mean, essentially it’s all based on the perception of American weakness and under Obama America was indeed perceptibly weakened - but if Trump forcefully indicates those days are over? Possibly such a change challenges the alliance - if America is back as a power player in the Mideast and Iran plans to stymie his plans for a naval base in the Mediterranean, maybe Putin's calculations regarding Syria do indeed turn sour. Still, the guy is all about projecting strength at America’s expense so hard to see him just walking away from Assad - does that mean that maybe there’s a door opening here to some sort of peace agreement? If there is, can’t see Iran and Russia agreeing to anything less than Assad staying in power - they’ve staked too much of their reputations on that happening.

And then there’s ISIS to worry about - Syria really is just a mess of bad options, which is exactly what smart people predicted would happen when Obama embraced an appeasement that enabled and boosted Iran and Russia's aspirations for the wretched place. Is it even possible to choose a least bad option from this mess? Maybe not. You have to defeat ISIS - you have to reward the Kurds without pissing off the Turks - you have to split up the country in order to create a safe place for the Sunni majority - you have to come to some kind of agreement with Russia and Iran about Assad - and then even if you manage to pull all that off you need to deal with the radicalized Islamist elements roaming all about the fucking country who could send the whole thing into the dumper again. It’s hard to believe that the least bad option is going to end up being to liberate Raqqa and then leave Assad, Putin and Iran to do what they will - but what if indeed that is where we’re at? Again, back when the Syrian war was in its early stages I read several essays that predicted that if America didn’t get involved soon it would be impossible to pick up the pieces later - at least, not without a significant military commitment. Kinda looking like a good prediction.

But does all that mean it was wrong for Trump to strike Syria? No - the chemical attack was a direct challenge to American authority and credibility in the region - Trump did the right thing - Obama clearly wouldn't have acted because he was all about delegitimizing America power and we see how that worked out - so Trump did the right thing. What we do next is a much more difficult question to answer.

Is Trump's action in Syria the beginning of the end of the debacle that was Obama's foreign policy?

About that Syria strike. First, pretty much ends the whole Trump colluded with the Russians narrative, no? I mean, if there was truth to it, the Russians would have proof of some kind - that seems a safe bet, yes? And if they didn’t put that ‘proof’ to use as leverage against the strike, there sure as hell would be using it now as payback for the strike. Of course this doesn't amount to proof positive there was no collusion, but c’mon, the narrative is being steadily drained of credibility so I think it’s time to turn the page on that one.

Then there’s what it says about Obama’s horrible foreign policy record - any objective observer already knew the Obama administration was a foreign policy disaster - christ, Alan Dershowitz, as true blue a liberal as you’re gonna find, called him the worst foreign policy president the country’s ever had - but many liberals and most of the media still live in denial of this fact - and Obama clearly lives in denial of it - witness his almost too idiotic to believe statement that the proudest moment of his presidency was when he walked away from his redline in Syria, opened the door to a Putin power play in the region so he could supposedly get rid of Assad’s chemical weapons [only a fool believed that was actually gonna happen] all while appeasing Iran [and thereby pissing off every American ally in the Mideast] so as to push through his nuke deal with them - a deal that will never do what what it claims to do. And this atrocious mess of incompetence and naivety is Obama’s proudest moment as president. The left is never going to acknowledge how awful a president Obama was - such an acknowledgement would completely undermine their belief system - but hopefully this Syria action works to sap a little of the arrogance from their ideological chauvinism.

Not that this action can’t go wrong - the possibility of going wrong is always present in any military action - Putin and Iran can still choose to escalate and then Trump’s very capable national security team will really be put to the test to come up with good answers - but this action was necessary - it was the least bad option once Assad laid down the challenge - not just as regards our friends and foes in the Mideast, but just as importantly as regards China and the North Korea problem. That’s especially true if the whole point of this was to see if the Trump administration would be as pathetic a pushover as Obama’s.

The key question for me going forward is how important a role did Mattis and McMaster play in bringing about this response - were they responding to the wishes of Trump or was he responding to counsel from them - or was everybody pretty much on the same page once Assad threw down the challenge? Indeed, given how quickly they were able to single out a target, had Mattis and McMaster already prepped for this inevitability? That would be a comforting thought.

Will Ivanka and her husband become the real rulers of the Oval Office?

Article by Josh Rogin in Washington Post about how Trump’s son in law Kushner is managing behind the scenes whatever the emerging ‘China policy’ is going to be got me thinking about how the Trump presidency may be morphing into a shadow presidency run by a select group of trusted others. This was always the hope for people sceptical about Trump’s ‘skill set’ being a good fit for the Oval Office - ie that after a few months the rigours of the job would start to annoy/frustrate him and he’d look to pass the hard work off on a trusted group so that he could concentrate on presidential theatrics and golf - the question then becoming which faction in the West Wing would win the looming power struggle. Given the way Trump feels about ivanka she and her husband were always gonna have the upper hand in this game - assuming of course this game is actually on and they have a strong desire to play it. With the responsibilities Kushner has taken on and with Ivanka getting an office in the West Wing, I’m guessing we have an answer - and if the rumors are true that Kushner has been feeding negative stories about Bannon to the media, that would pretty much confirm it.

Assuming this is indeed what’s going on, the important question for me then becomes: where do Mattis, McMaster, Kelley and Tillerson fit in? Along with Haley, are they themselves another power group looking for leverage? My guess is people like Mattis and McMaster would look upon someone like Bannon as a person not to be trusted with power - but does that mean they necessarily align with Ivanka and Jared? Dunford did invite Kushner to Iraq and he happily accepted the challenge - maybe that’s a clue.

Haley I think has been the most impressive cabinet pick so far, but Mattis is quietly doing some interesting things. The McMaster effect hasn’t shown up yet far as I can tell - but he’s making good hires and I fully expect his influence to become increasingly apparent, although possibly not in the person of Trump himself - foreign policy is probably the most daunting task a president takes on and this is especially true of Trump who came into the office with no deep knowledge nor clear ideas in that regard - so for a coherent and capable foreign policy to emerge is gonna be a tricky thing and one will have to in many ways simply ignore what Trump himself might be saying - if a coherent foreign policy doesn’t emerge that will be because Ivanka and her husband have failed to get control of the Oval Office leaving chaos and confusion to rule the day.

As for Tillerson - don’t know what to make of him yet - I would hope he’s working closely with Mattis and McMaster to forge a way out of the mess Obama left behind - but it’s just too early to tell - and the snail pace of nominations to key jobs at State certainly doesn’t help. We’ll see how he responds to the gas attack in Syria - so far not promising - him saying Assad will be staying to me was just acknowledging an unfortunate truth - once Obama appeased Iran and let Russia into Syria as a power broker, getting rid of Assad became a much more difficult thing to do, if even possible at all - but him saying the fate of Syria was in the hands of Syrians was ridiculous. Still, the true test will come once it’s confirmed Assad again used chemical weapons against civilians - simply blaming this barbarity on Obama’s incompetence and weakness won’t do regardless of how true it might be - I believe America needs to respond in force - Obama letting Putin into Syria complicates that response a great deal, but I gotta believe Mattis and McMaster believe a strong response is necessary - if all we get are words, I’ll see that as a very bad sign, a sign that the power struggle going on in the West Wing right now is far from being settled and chaos indeed rules the day.